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"JUNK SCIENCE":
THE CRIMINAL CASES
PAUL C. GIANNELLI*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Currently, the role of expert witnesses in civil trials is under
vigorous attack. "Expert testimony is becoming an embarrassment
to the law of evidence," notes one commentator.' Articles like those
entitled "Experts up to here' 2 and "The Case Against Expert Witnesses" 3 appear in Forbes and Fortune. Terms such as "junk science,"
"litigation medicine," "fringe science," and "frontier science" are
in vogue. 4 Physicians complain that "[1]egal cases can now be decided on the type of evidence that the scientific community rejected
decades ago." 5
A.

THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

The expert testimony provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence are the focal point of criticism. Adopted in 1975, the Federal
Rules "revolutionized ' 6 the role of experts by "sweep[ing] away the
restrictive dogma that curtailed expert proof."' 7 By 1986, however,
a backlash against the expanded role of experts had developed.
Judge Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote
that it "is time to take hold of expert testimony in federal trials."
* Albert J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case
Western Reserve University.
I James W. McElhaney, The 1992 All-Angus Rules, 19 LrrG. 19, 21 (Fall 1992).
2 Deirdre Fanning, Experts up to here, FORBES,July 13, 1987, at 378.
3 Walter Olson, The Case Against Expert Witnesses, FORTUNE, Sept. 25, 1989, at 133.

4 Clifford J. Zatz, Defenses on the Frontiers of Science, 19 LrxmG. 13 (Fall 1992).
5 James L. Mills & Duane Alexander, Teratogens and "Litogens", 315 NEw ENG.J. MED.
1234, 1235 (1986).

6 Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the FederalRules of Evidence: Insuring
Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 43 ("Ten years after the revolution in expert witness testimony, the legal community has not yet fully appreciated the
true impact of the new approach and attitude of the Federal Rules of Evidence on trial

practice.").
7 Margaret B. Berger, United States v. Scop: The Common-Law Approach to an Expert's
Opinion About a Vitness's Credibility Still Does Not Work, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 559, 559 (1989).

8 In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986).
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There are two aspects to his criticism. First, "experts whose opinions are available to the highest bidder have no place testifying in a
court of law." 9 Second, courts should reject "opinions of experts
not based upon a generally accepted scientific principle."' 10
The general acceptance standard for the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence is derived from Frye v. United States,II a 1923 decision prohibiting the admissibility of polygraph evidence. The Frye
test requires that scientific evidence be generally accepted in the scientific community as a prerequisite to admissibility; it is more restrictive than Federal Rule 702,12 a deceptively simple provision.
Rule 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
3
otherwise. 1
9 Id.

For an insightful discussion of the "hired gun" problem, see Samuel R. Gross,

Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1113 (proposing several changes to ensure the appointment of neutral experts).
10 Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 884 F.2d 167, 168 (5th Cir. 1989)
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting from denial of en banc review). Judge Higginbotham also
wrote that the "role of experts" is "one of the more vexing problems currently facing
the federal courts." Id. See also Chaulk v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 808 F.2d 639, 644
(7th Cir. 1986) (commenting that "[t]here is hardly anything, not palpably absurd on its
face, that cannot now be proved by some so-called 'experts.' ") (citation omitted).
11 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
12 The Frye standard places a special burden on the admissibility of novel scientific
evidence. It is not enough that a qualified expert testify to the validity of a novel technique; general acceptance in the scientific community is required. This conservative
standard is thought to be more demanding than an opposing approach, which treats
scientific evidence no differently than other types of evidence-balancing its probative
value against the risks of unfair prejudice and misleading the jury. See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ch. I (2d ed. 1993) (discussing
the admissibility of novel scientific evidence, including the Frye test).
13 FED. R. EvID. 702. Some commentators believe that there is no need for change.
See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the FederalRules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be

Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631 (1991).
FED. R. EVID. 703, which governs the bases of expert testimony, is also a frequent
target of criticism. See ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 176 (2d ed. 1991) ("Rule 703 was a controversial rule

when enacted, and it remains controversial."). Rule 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
See also Paul C. Giannelli, Expert Testimony and the Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L.

REV. 45 (1993) (discussing confrontation issues that arise under Rule 703 in criminal
cases); Michael C. McCarthy, Note, "Helpful" or "Reasonably Reliable"? Analyzing the Expert
Witness's Methodology Under FederalRules of Evidence 702 and 703, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 350

(1992) (discussing the confusion between Rules 702 and 703).
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Instead of Frye's demand for general scientific acceptance, mere
"assistance" to the jury is the touchstone of admissibility under Rule
702.14
Peter Huber, a prominent critic of the federal rules of evidence,
coined the phrase "junk science" to describe judicial acceptance of
unreliable expert testimony. His book, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science
in the Courtroom, sparked a heated debate about the nature and extent of the abuse of science in litigation. 15 Huber's most sensational
example of junk science involved a "soothsayer" who "with the
backing of expert testimony from a doctor and several police de14 On June 28, 1993, while this article was in press, the Court decided Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), a case involving the admissibility
of expert testimony in a civil trial. The Court ruled that the Frye test had not survived
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court, however, also held that scientific evidence must satisfy a reliability text.
Under the Daubert analysis, the trial court must make "a preliminary assessment of
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid
and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in
issue." In performing this "gatekeeping function," the trial court may consider a
number of factors. First, the court should determine whether the scientific theory or
technique can be and has been tested. Citing scientific authorities, the Court recognized
that a hallmark of science is empirical testing. Second, a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing scientific validity is whether a theory or technique has
been subjected to peer review and publication. The peer review and publication process
increases the likelihood that flaws in methodology will be detected. Third, a technique's
known or potential rate of error is also a relevant factor. Fourth, the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation is another indicium of
trustworthiness. Finally, "general acceptance" remains an important consideration.
Although the Court rejected "general acceptance" as the sole criterion for admissibility,
it recognized its relevance in assessing the reliability of scientific evidence. These factors, however, are neither dispositive nor exhaustive. Indeed, the Court emphasized
that the Rule 702 standard is "a flexible one."
A news report on Daubertdescribed the case as "invit[ing] judges to be aggressive in
screening out ill-founded or speculative scientific theories." Linda Greenhouse, Justices
PutJudges in Charge of DecidingReliability of Scientific Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1993,
at A1O. Nevertheless, whether the lower courts interpret Daubert in that fashion remains
to be seen.
15 PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM

(1991)

[hereinafter GALILEO'S REVENGE]. See also Peter W. Huber,Medical Experts and the Ghost of
Galileo, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 119; Peter W. Huber,Junk Science
in the Courtroom, FORBES, July 8, 1991, at 68.
For reviews of Huber's book, see Arthur Austin, Book Review, 29 Hous. L. REV. 481
(1992); Robert F. Blomquist, Science, Toxic Tort Law, and Expert Evidence: A Reaction to Peter
Huber, 44 ARK. L. REV. 629 (1991); Jeff L. Lewin, Calabresi's Revenge? Junk Science in the
Work of Peter Huber, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183 (1992); Anthony Z. Roisman, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom, TRIAL, Jan. 1992, at 76 ("Because Galileo's Revenge is
written in an effective, entertaining style, it is particularly dangerous."); Book Note, Rebel Without A Cause, 105 HARV. L. REV. 935 (1992) (reviewing GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK
SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM) ("[Ilt is imperative to disentangle Huber's two criticisms:
one evidentiary, againstjunk science; the other policy-oriented, against modem substantive tort law.").
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partment officials" won a million dollar jury award due to the loss of
her "psychic powers following a CAT scan." 1 6 Huber advocates the
Frye test as the way to curtail the use of junk science. 17
These attacks on scientific evidence have not gone unheeded.
Judges now feel compelled to justify their decisions to admit expert
testimony by claiming that the evidence "is not 'junk science"' and
that the expert "is no quack." 18 Furthermore, some courts are raising obstacles to the admissibility of scientific evidence. By 1991, the
Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, was prepared to apply the restrictive
Frye test to civil cases, a significant departure from prior practice. 19
In response to such developments, momentum for reform began with the Civil Rules Committee, which proposed an amendment
to Federal Rule 702 in 1991. The proposal requires expert testimony to "substantially" assist, rather than merely "assist," the trier
of fact, and then only if the testimony is based on "reasonably reliable" information. 20 The last provision apparently embodies a modified Frye rule.2 1 The Committee also proposed more expansive
discovery of expert testimony in civil cases, including disclosure of a
detailed written report "previewing" the expert's testimony. 22 This
16 GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 15, at 3-4. Vice President Quayle cites this example without including the next sentence. Huber's next sentence is: "The trial judge
threw out that verdict." Id. at 4. Instead, the Vice President writes that such stories "are
becoming almost commonplace." Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV.
559, 566 (1992).
17 GALILEO's REVENGE, supra note 15, at 14, 199.
18 Carroll v. Otis Elevator Co., 896 F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1990)(Easterbrook, J.,
concurring).
One commentator, however, uses Carrollto illustrate unnecessary expert testimony.
The plaintiff was injured when an unidentified child pushed the emergency stop button
on an escalator. "An 'elevator button expert'-a clinical psychologist -testified that 'red
buttons attract small children, this button was unreasonably easy for a child to push, and
that a covered stop button is less accessible to children than an uncovered stop button.'" McElhaney, supra note 1, at 21.
19 Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992). In an earlier case, a panel of the Fifth
Circuit applied the Frye test in a civil case. Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 739 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1984). For a further discussion of this point, see infra text
accompanying notes 35-36.
See generally Recent Case, Evidence-Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-Fifth Circuit Limits Permissible Scientific Evidence to Generally Accepted Theories-Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (per curiam), 105 HARV. L. REV. 791
(1992).
20 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 156 (1991) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft].
21 The accompanying Advisory Committee note states that this standard "does not
mandate a return to the strictures of Frye v. United States.... However, the court is called
upon to reject testimony that is based upon premises lacking any significant support and
acceptance within the scientific community." Id. at 157 (Advisory Committee's note).
22 Proposed amendment, FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(2) (disclosure of expert testimony).
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discovery provision is tied directly to Rule 702; failure to comply
with the discovery rule renders the expert's testimony
23
inadmissible.
The impetus for reform, however, was not limited to the judicial arena. The President's Council on Competitiveness, chaired by
former Vice President Dan Quayle, established a Civil Justice Reform Task Force. 24 Once again, expert testimony was targeted.
Quayle declared that "it is time to reject the notion that 'junk science' is truly relevant evidence." 25 The Task Force offered its own
amendment to Federal Rule 702. It tracked the proposal of the Civil
Rules Committee, requiring expert testimony to provide "substantial" assistance to the trier of fact; the Task Force then added two
new provisions. First, expert testimony must be "based on a widely
accepted explanatory theory." Second, an expert receiving a contingent fee may not testify. 26 Not waiting for the amendment process, former President Bush imposed these requirements on
Id. at 89. The parties must "provide other litigants with a written report from its expert.
The report must be detailed and complete-in essence, a preview of the direct testimony
from such person, including any exhibits to be used to summarize or support the person's opinions. After the report has been provided, the expert may be deposed .... Id.
at 67 (Letter to Chair, Standing Committee, from Chair, Civil Rules Committee, June
13, 1991).
23 The proposed Rule provides:
[If) Testimony providing scientific, technical, or other specialized [knowledge] information, in theform of an opinion or otherwise, may be permitted only if(1) the information is
reasonably reliable and will substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, and (2) the [a] witness is qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to provide such testimony, [may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise]. Except with leave of courtfor
good cause shown, the witness shall not testify on direct examination in any civil action to any
opinion orinference, orreason or basis therefor, that has not been seasonably disclosed as required
by Rules 26(a)(2) and 26(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id. at 156 (deleted material in brackets; new material in italics).
24 Solicitor General Kenneth Starr chaired the Task Force. The Task Force report,
Agenda for CivilJustice Reform in America, is reprinted in 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 977 (1992).
The Task Force prepared a number of documents: (I) proposed amendments to
the Federal Rules, (2) the Access to justice Act of 1992, which was transmitted to Congress, and (3) the Civil Justice Reform Model State Amendments. Id.
25 Junk Science or Junk Law?, 3 THE EXPERT WITNESS J. (Aug./Sept. 1991).

26 The proposed amendment to Rule 702 provides:
(a) Qualification of Expert Testimony. If the court finds (1) that scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will substantiallyassist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(2) that a proffered witness is qualified as an expert in thefieldfor which the expert
is called to testify by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; and
(3) that the proffered witness' testimony is based on a widely accepted explanatoy theoy;
then the witness may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
(b) Prohibition on Contingent Feefor Expert Witness. A witness shall be qualified under
Rule 702(a)(2) only ifthe courtfinds that any compensation to the witness directly or indirectly
will not vary as a result of any outcome of the case.
Agenda For CivilJustice Reform in American, supra note 24, at 1049 (new material in italics).
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government attorneys in civil cases by executive order. 2 7 Under this
order, a theory is considered "widely accepted" if it is propounded
28
by at least a substantial minority of experts in the relevant field.
With this backdrop, the U.S. Supreme Court took certiorari in
Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. 29 to determine whether the
Frye test survived the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Daubert involved the admissibility of expert testimony concerning
whether Bendectin, an anti-nausea drug, causes birth defects.
B.

THE CRIMINAL CASES

Despite the highly visible efforts to reform the rules governing
experts in the civil arena, the "junk science" debate has all but ignored criminal prosecutions. With one exception, Huber's book focuses on only civil litigation. 30 Similarly, the proposed amendment
to Rule 702 was promulgated by the Civil Rules Committee in order
to combat perceived abuses in civil trials. The Committee wrote:
"Particularlyin civil litigation with high financial stakes, large expenditures for marginally useful expert testimony has become commonplace. Procurement of expert testimony is occasionally used as a
trial technique to wear down adversaries.- 3 1 The second sentence
of the proposed rule applies only to civil cases: if a party fails to
32
comply with the civil discovery rules, its expert is disqualified.
The Quayle proposals are also limited to civil litigation. Indeed, the
33
Supreme Court chose a civil case to decide the Frye issue.
This neglect of the problems of expert testimony in criminal
27 CivilJustice Reform, Exec. Order No. 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1991).

28 Id. On Jan. 30, 1993, the Department ofJustice issued preliminary guidelines on
the implementation of this Executive Order. Department ofJustice, Memorandum of
Preliminary Guidance on Implementation of the Litigation Reforms of Executive Order
No. 12,778, 57 FED. REG. 3640 (1992).
29 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992). For a discussion of Daubert, see supra note 14.
The Court had declined to grant certiorari to decide the issue on two prior occasions, one of which occurred only a year before. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.,
112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992). In Christophersen,Justice White, along with Justice Blackmun,
dissented from the denial of certiorari, commenting that "[iut is an issue that has long
divided the federal courts." Id. at 1281. See also Mustafa v. United States, 479 U.S. 953
(1986).
30 The criminal case cited by Huber is Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
GALILEO'S REVENGE, supra note 15, at 217-18. For a discussion of Barefoot, see infra text
accompanying notes 49-72.
31 Preliminary Draft, supra note 20, at 156 (emphasis added).
32 See supra note 23. The result is perhaps explainable, if not justifiable, due to the
committee structure. At the time the amendment was proposed, there were two committees, a Civil Rules Committee and a Criminal Rules Committee. The proposed
amendments originated with the Civil Rules Committee. An Evidence Rules Committee
has recently been appointed.
33 The Court declined to decide the issue in United States v.Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786
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prosecutions is deplorable, if not inexplicable.3 4 The Frye test,
which has generated so much controversy, arose from a criminal
case, and historically had been applied in only criminal cases. 3 5 Not
until 1984 was the Fye test applied in a federal civil case.3 6 The
criticism of Frye in criminal cases had surfaced earlier.3 7 Indeed, the
National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists sponsored a conference on the Fye test in the early 1980s. 38 Building on this conference, the ABA Section of Science and Technology organized a
symposium on the topic, focusing on proposed amendments to Rule
702.39 Further, the ABA Criminal Justice Section issued a report
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992), a criminal case in which DNA evidence was
admitted.
34 One explanation is politics. "The 1992 Republican platform included a promise
to throw out 'junk science' from American courtrooms." Lewin, supra note 15, at 185.
"Mr. Quayle's cause of reducing costs in civil litigation is taking on the aura of a campaign issue for next year." Randall Samborn, VP Volleys Once More With the ABA, NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 11, 1991, at 1, 28.
35 See FAUST F. Rossi, EXPERT WITNESSES 36 (1991) ("The Frye standard traditionally
has been applied almost exclusively in criminal cases."); MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 703.02, at 651 (3d ed. 1991) ("The Frye test has been
applied most frequently over the years in criminal cases .... "); 1 DAVID W. LOUiSELL &
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 853 (1977) ("The Frye standard .. . is
rarely applied in civil litigation; Frye itself has been cited only in a very few civil cases,
principally in state courts in connection with blood tests to determine paternity.").
In advocating the general acceptance standard in his book, however, Peter Huber
fails to acknowledge the fact that Frye had been applied almost exclusively to criminal
cases.
36 Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 739 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1984),
appears to be the first case. The court excluded evidence based on voice stress analysis,
a decision that followed earlier criminal cases. See 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra
note 12, § 8-6 (discussing scientific and legal status of voice stress analysis).
37 See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1207-08 (1980) ("[Ihe problems
Frye has engendered-the difficulties in applying the test and the anomolous results it
creates-so far outweigh [its] advantages that the argument for adopting a different test
has become overwhelming."); Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidnce: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IowA L. REV. 879, 915 (1982) (Frye's "main drawbacks are its
inflexibility, confusion of issues, and superfluity."); John Strong, Questions Affecting the
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 14 ("The Frye standard, however,
tends to obscure these proper considerations by asserting an undefinable general acceptance as the principal if not sole determinative factor.").
38 Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187 (1983). The National
Conference of Lawyers and Scientists is ajoint organization of the ABA and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
39 See Fredric I. Lederer, Resolving the Frye Dilemma-A Reliability Approach, 26
JURIMETRICS J. 240 (1986); Margaret A. Berger, A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific
Evidence, 26JuRIMETRICSJ. 245 (1986);James E. Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured
and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence Rule 702, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 249
(1986); Paul C. Giannelli, Scientific Evidence: A ProposedAmendment to FederalRule 702, 26
JURIMETRICsJ. 260 (1986).
Commentaries on the various proposals were later discussed at the ABA's annual
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identifying the continued validity of Frye as an important unresolved
issue. 4 0
Moreover, the junk science opponents' failure to deal with
criminal prosecutions cannot be explained by differences in the use
of expert testimony in civil and criminal cases. 4 1 Scientific evidence
has played a significantly greater role in criminal prosecutions in recent years. DNA profiling is only the latest example. 4 2 Sophisticated instrumental techniques such as neutron activation analysis,
atomic absorption, mass spectrometry, and scanning electron microscopy are common. 43 Other examples include electrophoretic
blood testing, voice prints, bite mark comparison, hypnotically refreshed testimony, trace metal detection, voice stress analysis, and
horizontal gaze nystagmus. 4 4 In addition, the use of social science
research, often in the form of "syndrome" evidence, has flooded the
courts. For example, evidence of rape trauma syndrome, battered
wife syndrome, and child abuse accommodation syndrome is now
45
frequently admitted at trial.
In addition, the failure to take account of scientific evidence in
criminal litigation has led to some remarkable results. While former
conference in August 1986. Rules for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 79
(1987).
40 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: A FRESH REVIEW
AND EVALUATION 70 (Aug. 1987), reprinted in 120 F.R.D. 299, 368 (1988).
41 Judge Becker and Professor Orenstein have commented:
Some of the most important issues concerning expert testimony, such as the admissibility of DNA typing, voiceprints, and polygraphs, arise in criminal cases. The
Civil Rules Committee proposals may not focus sufficiently upon the specialized
needs of the prosecution or of criminal defendants. We note that the Criminal
Rules Committee disapproved the Civil Rules Committee's initial Rule 702 proposal, but the Standing Committee nevertheless modified and submitted it for public
comment.
Edward R. Becker & Avia Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years-The
Effect of "Plain Meaning"Jurisprudence,The Needfor an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestionsfor Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 861-62
(1992).
42 For a discussion of DNA evidence, see articles in this symposium: William C.
Thompson, Evaluatingthe Admissibility of New Forensic Tests: Lessonsfrom the "DNA War", 84
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22 (1993); Rockne Harmon, Legal Criticisms of DNA Typing:
IVheres the Bee?., 84J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 175 (1993); PeterJ. Neufeld, Have You No
Sense of Decency?, 84J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 189 (1993); See also 2 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 12 (DNA evidence).

43 For a discussion of these techniques as well as the others cited in this essay, see
GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 12.

44 See Stephanie Busloff, Comment, Can Your Eyes Be Used Against You? The Use of the
HorizontalGaze Nystagmus Test in the Courtroom, 84J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 203 (1993).

45 See I GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 12, ch. 9 (discussing battered woman,
rape trauma, and child sexual abuse accommodation syndromes); David L. Faigman, To
Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38
EMORY LJ. 1005 (1989).
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President Bush's executive order required U.S. attorneys in civil
cases to meet a heightened admissibility standard ("wide acceptance") when introducing scientific evidence, 4 6 federal prosecutors
were left free in the DNA cases to argue for a lower standard,
"urg[ing] that Rule 702 creates a liberal rule of admissibility which
now supersedes Frye." 4 7 Similarly, while former Vice President
Quayle was championing the need for liberal discovery in civil litigation, federal prosecutors were opposing discovery of the most elementary kind in DNA cases. 48
This essay extends the junk science debate to criminal prosecutions. It examines three issues raised by this debate: (1) the necessity for use of a stringent standard when determining the
admissibility of novel scientific evidence, (2) the need to secure the
services of unbiased experts, and (3) the desirability of liberal pretrial discovery of expert testimony.
II.

NOVEL SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

The impact of "junk science" in criminal cases is poignantly illustrated by Barefoot v. Estelle,4 9 the only criminal case that Huber
discusses. Thomas Barefoot was convicted of capital murder in
Texas. In the penalty phase of the trial, the prosecution offered the
testimony of two psychiatrists who testified about Barefoot's future
dangerousness, a qualifying factor under the Texas death penalty
statute. 50 One psychiatrist, Dr. James Grigson, without ever examining Barefoot, testified that there was a " 'one hundred percent and
absolute' chance that Barefoot would commit future acts of criminal
violence." 5 1 Barefoot argued before the Supreme Court that, due
to its unreliability, admission of this evidence violated the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause.
In an amicus brief, the American Psychiatric Association (APA)
stated that the "unreliability of psychiatric predictions of long-term
future dangerousness is by now an established fact within the proSee supra text accompanying note 28.
United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir. 1990) (vacated after death of
defendant), 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1991) (en banc). See also United States v. Yee, 134
F.R.D. 161, 188 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (prosecutors argued that Frye has been displaced).
48 See infra text accompanying notes 122-24.
49 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
50 TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(b)(1) (West 1993) (requiring ajury
finding that "there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society"). SeeJurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of the Texas statute).
51 Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 919 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (quoting from record).
46
47
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fession," and the "APA's best estimate is that two out of three predictions of long-term future violence made by psychiatrists are
wrong."' 52 The APA position was supported by a substantial body of
research 5 3 and misstated by Dr. Grigson at trial. 54 Nevertheless, the
Court ruled that such testimony was not constitutionally infirm.
Writing for the Court, Justice White noted that "[n]either petitioner
nor the [APA] suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong with re'55
spect to future dangerousness, only most of the time."
Given the context, such a standard-"not always wrong"shocks the conscience. 5 6 One suspects that the Justices would not
choose a neurosurgeon on such a basis, nor even a podiatrist.
Thomas Barefoot was executed on October 24, 1984.57 As Huber

notes, one could favor the death penalty and "yet still recoil at the
thought that ajunk science fringe of psychiatry... could decide who
58
will be sent to the gallows."
Some commentators believe that testimony concerning future
dangerousness is so lacking in reliability that it is unethical. 59 In52 Id. at 920 (quoting brief).
53 See Charles Patrick Ewing, Preventive Detention and Execution: The Constitutionality of
PunishingFuture Crimes, 15 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 139 (1991); Michael L. Radelet &James
W. Marquart, Assessing NondangerousnessDuringPenalty Phases of Capital Trials, 54 ALBANY L.
REv. 845 (1990); Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 97

(1984).
54 Defense counsel cross-examined Dr. Grigson concerning studies that demonstrated the inherent unreliability of predictions of future dangerousness. In response,
Dr. Grigson testified that only a small minority of psychiatrists accepted these studies
and these studies did not represent the view of the APA. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 919.
55 Id. at 901. At another point the Court wrote: "We are not persuaded that such
testimony is almost entirely unreliable ...." Id. at 899.
56 The term "shocks the conscience" was used by Justice Frankfurter in Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), in which the Court condemned the stomach-pumping of a suspect to retrieve evidence. The term is even more apt here. In a scathing
dissent in Barefoot, Justice Blackmun wrote:
In the present state of psychiatric knowledge, this is too much for me. One may
accept this in a routine lawsuit for money damages, but when a person's life is at
stake ... a requirement of greater reliability should prevail. In a capital case, the
specious testimony of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by
the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist's words, equates with death
itself.
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916. See also George E. Dix, The Death Penalty, "Dangerousness, "Psychiatric Testimony, and ProfessionalEthics, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 151, 172 (1977) (commenting on

Dr. Grigson's "willingness to operate at the brink of quackerty").
57 United Press International, Placard-IWielding Crowds Cheer Twin Injections, Oct. 30,

1984.
58 Galileo's Revenge, supra note 15, at 220.

59 "[There] is good reason to conclude that psychologists and psychiatrists act unethically when they render predictions of dangerousness that provide a legal basis for restricting another person's interest in life or liberty." Ewing, supra note 53, at 162. See
also Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, Is it Unethical to Offer Predictions of Future l'io-
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deed, the APA reprimanded Dr. Grigson for claiming 100% accuracy in capital cases in which he did not examine the defendant. 60
Nevertheless, Dr. Grigson continued to testify. By May 1990, juries
had returned death penalties in 118 of the 127 cases in which he had
testified. 6 ' It is essentially the same testimony in every case:
He'll take the stand, listen to a recitation of facts about the killing and
the killer, and then-usually without examining the defendant, without
ever setting eyes on him until the day of the trial-tell the jury that, as
a matter of medical science, he can assure them the defendant will pose a
continuing 62
danger to society as defined by [the Texas statute]. That's

all it takes.
Dr. Grigson apparently revels in selling his views to the jury and
setting traps for defense counsel, 63 and when now questioned about
the APA position on the unreliability of predictions of future dangerousness, he replies: "The Supreme Court disagreed with
them." 6 4
Dr. Grigson gained notoriety, if not fame, as "Dr. Death" in the
documentary film, The Thin Blue Line, which concerned the capital
trial of Randall Adams. 65 Grigson's testimony about Adams' future
dangerousness helped put Adams on death row.6 6 Even though Adlence?, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 621, 629 (1992) ("The ethics of predictions of future
violence in such a context indeed are questionable.").
60 Radelet & Marquart, supra note 53, at 851 n.31; RON ROSENBAUM, TRAVELS WrrH
DR. DEATH 218 (1991) (The APA "sent me a letter saying that this will serve as a reprimand.") (quoting Dr. Grigson).
The chapter on Dr. Grigson in Rosenbaum's book was originally published as an
article. Ron Rosenbaum, Travels With Dr. Death, VANiTY FAIR, May 1990, at 141.
61 ROSENBAUM, supra note 60, at 206.
62 Id. at 210.
63 See id. at 211 ("And as a bonus for the prosecutors who hire him, the Doctor also
does his lethal best to destroy defense attorneys and defense witnesses who challenge
him."); id. at 211-12 ("[W]hat makes him popular with prosecutors is that he will go the
extra mile; he will go for the jugular to score points to win."); id. at 220 ("The Doctor
had told me of the particular relish he has for doing damage on cross-examination. 'I
always hold something back for cross,' he said one evening in Lubbock."); id. at 228 ("It
seemed to me... the Doctor brought more than his usual competitive zeal to this casehe brought something extra, an almost personal animus, to the crusade to get Gayland
Bradford executed.").
64 Id. at 218.
65 The Thin Blue Line (1988) was made by New York Filmmaker Errol Morris, who
originally planned to do a film on Dr. Grigson but changed his mind after investigating
the Adams case. ROSENBAUM, supra note 60, at 219.
66 Adam's death penalty was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court because the jury
selection process was defective. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980), rev'g Adams v.
State, 577 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). The Governor commuted Adams' death
penalty, thereby depriving Adams of a new trial. Adams v. State, 624 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.
Crim. 1981). Adams eventually was granted a new trial. Ex pare Adams, 768 S.W.2d
281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
Adams recounts his ordeal in RANDALL DALE ADAMS ET AL., ADAMS v. TEXAs (1991).

PAUL C. GIANNELLI

[Vol. 84

ams was subsequently released due to innocence,6 7 the Doctor has
not changed his mind. According to Grigson, "Adams 'will kill
again.' "68
Barefoot cannot be discounted as a "constitutional case" that has
limited precedential value in interpreting evidentiary rules. Had the
Court relied on some constitutional provision other than the Eighth
Amendment, such an argument would have much cogency. The
Court's "cruel and unusual punishment" jurisprudence, however,
has repeatedly emphasized that a heightened standard of reliability
is required when the penalty is death. According to the Court, "the
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment gives rise
to a special 'need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment' in any capital case." 69 In addition, prosecutors have argued that Barefoot is not limited to constitutional
cases. For example, federal prosecutors asserted that Barefoot, not
70
Frye, was the controlling evidentiary standard in United States v. Yee,
the first federal case considering the admissibility of the FBI's DNA
procedure.
The Bush Administration had it backwards; if there is to be a
stringent standard of admissibility, it should be applied in criminal,
not civil, cases. The interests involved in criminal and capital prosecutions require a cautious approach, although not necessarily Frye. I
have argued elsewhere that prosecutors should be required to satisfy a heavy burden before novel scientific evidence is admitted at
trial. 7 ' Only the government has the resources to commission or
67 After an extensive Texas habeas proceeding, in which Adams again claimed his
innocence, the judge wrote:
Although the court cannot determine the applicant is "innocent" of the Wood murder ["Since innocence is not a basis in Texas for a new trial.. ."], on the basis of the
evidence presented at the habeas corpus hearing, applying the law which places the
burden of proof on the State beyond a reasonable doubt, the court would have
found applicant not guilty at a bench trial.
Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d at 285 (quoting habeas record).
68 ROSENBAUM, supra note 60, at 220 (quoting Dr. Grigson).
69 Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584 (1988) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430
U.S. 349, 363-64 (1977), and Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)
(White, J., concurring in judgment)).
See also Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989) ("The finality of the death
penalty requires 'a greater degree of reliability' when it is imposed.") (quoting Lockhart
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (Because the death penalty is different, the Court has "invalidated procedural rules that
tended to diminish the reliability of the sentencing determination.").
70 134 F.R.D. 161, 188 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (magistrate's report). The magistrate ruled
that, with regard to DNA evidence, the Frye test was the applicable standard, and that the
DNA evidence satisfied the Frye test.
71 Giannelli, supra note 37, at 1248 ("The prosecution in a criminal case should be
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conduct the necessary validity studies for this type of evidence.
If we are going to make mistakes in assessing the validity of a
novel technique, they should be mistakes delaying the admission of
reliable evidence and not mistakes of admitting unreliable evidence.
Professor Berger has put the question starkly: "[W]hat error rate
are we willing to tolerate when we might be sending someone to the
72
electric chair?"
The Court in Barefoot justified its lax evidentiary standard, in
part, by relying on the adversary system to "uncover, recognize, and
take due account of [the] shortcomings" of expert testimony2 3 Determining whether the adversary system is up to this task requires an
examination of a number of procedural rules, such as those governing the appointment of defense experts and pretrial discovery.
These issues are discussed in the following sections of this article.
III.

DEFENSE EXPERTS

The former Vice President's Task Force proposed an amendment to Rule 702, which prohibits the payment of contingent fees to
expert witnesses. The prohibition is broadly phrased. An expert is
disqualified if any compensation, "directly or indirectly," would vary
as a result of the outcome of the case.7 4 The rule is intended to
preclude the use of biased experts and might even extend to Dr.
Grigson, who reportedly earned $200,000 a year from expert-wit75
ness fees ($150 an hour) and from a limited private practice.
This proposal, however, does not deal with problems of institu76
tional bias-the control of crime laboratories by the police.
Problems in relying on police-controlled crime laboratories have
arisen in politically sensitive cases. For example, a federal grand
jury investigating the deaths of Black Panther leaders in a police raid
reported that the "testimony of the firearms examiner that he could
not have refused to sign what he believed was an inadequate and
required to establish the validity of a novel scientific technique beyond a reasonable
doubt.").
72 Katherine Bishop, Leaps of Science Create Quandaries on Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6,
1990, at B6, col. 3.
73 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898-89 (1983).
74 See supra note 26.
75 Rosenbaum, supra note 60, at 231. See also John Bloom, Doctor For the Prosecution,
AM. LAw., Nov. 1979, at 25 ("[L~ast year he earned more than $67,034 in fees from
Dallas County alone, a figure that doesn't include murder cases in other Texas cities.").
76 See Peterson et al., The Capabilities, Uses, and Effects of the Nation "s
CriminalisticsLaboratories, 30J. FORENSIC SCI. 10, 11 (1985) ("Seventy-nine percent of all [257 out of 319]
laboratories responding to our survey are located within law enforcement/public safety
agencies.").
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preliminary report on pain of potential discharge is highly alarming."' 7 7 Similarly, the prosecution of the Maguires as IRA terrorists
in Britain rested on evidence that was not only "scientifically false
but also known to be by all concerned parties and scientists." 7 8s As
discussed below, the problem of biased experts, although present in
criminal cases, is outweighed by far more serious systemic
problems.
A.

EXPERT ASSISTANCE FOR INDIGENTS

Those familiar with criminal prosecutions might be bemused by
a discussion of the contingent fee issue-not because they favor
such fees, but because obtaining the services of any defense expert
in criminal litigation is so difficult. Obtaining expert assistance is
generally not a problem for the prosecution, which has access to the
services of state, county, or metropolitan crime laboratories. In addition, federal forensic laboratories often provide their services to
state law enforcement agencies. For example, the services of the
FBI Laboratory are available to all duly constituted state, county,
79
and municipal law enforcement agencies in the United States.
These services, which are provided without charge, include both the
examination of evidence and the court appearance of the expert.
Forensic laboratory services, however, are not generally available to criminal defendants. A survey of approximately 300 crime
laboratories revealed that "fifty-seven percent . . . would only examine evidence submitted by law enforcement officials." 80 It is not
surprising, then, that Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel in their
1966 jury study commented: "Again, the imbalance between the
prosecution and defense appears. In 22 percent of the cases the
prosecution has the only expert witness, whereas in only 3 percent
of the cases does the defense have such an advantage." 8 1 Ten years
77 Lowell W. Bradford, Problems of Ethics and Behavior in the Forensic Sciences, 21 J. FoRENSIC Sci. 763, 767 (1976) (quoting U.S. Dist. Ct., N.D. Ill., E. Div., Report ofJanuary
1970 GrandJury 121).
78 The Maguires were accused of possessing an explosive as part of the IRA's terrorism campaign. The government's case rested on the presence of nitroglycerine on the
defendants' fingernails and gloves. Thin layer chromatography was used to detect the
nitroglycerine: "The tests were said to be as conclusive and irrefutable as fingerprints.
The entire underpinning for this assertion were proved not only to be scientifically false
but also known to be by all concerned parties and scientists .... ." See James E. Starrs,
The Forensic Scientist and the Open M1ind, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. SOC'Y 111, 141-42 (1991)
(citing May et al., Interim Report on the Maguire Case, London: HMSO (July 12, 1990)).
79 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 7 (rev. ed.
1984).
80

Peterson et al., supra note 76, at 13.

81 HARRY KALVEN, JR.

&

HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY

139 (1966).

See also Daniel
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later, the issue resurfaced in the voiceprint cases. As a National
Academy of Sciences report noted, a "striking fact about the trials
involving voicegram evidence to date is the very large proportion in
82
which the only experts testifying were those called by the state."
Although a number of federal and state statutes attempt to provide expert assistance, the coverage of these provisions is frequently quite limited.8 3 Some are restricted to capital cases8 4 or
drug prosecutions.8 5 Others impose unrealistic limitations on the
amount that may be expended for this purpose, such as $250 or
$300.86 Until 1986, when the ceiling was raised to $1000, the fed87
eral statute also contained a $300 maximum.
B.

AKE V. OKLAHOMA

In Barefoot, the Court noted that although the accused had not
offered the testimony of an opposing expert, there was no claim that
the trial court had "refused to provide an expert for petitioner."8 8
Nevertheless, it was not until two years later, in Ake v. Oklahoma,8 9
that the Court for the first time recognized a due process right to
expert assistance for indigents. Ake's attorney requested a psychiatric evaluation at state expense to prepare an insanity defense. The
trial court refused, and although insanity was the only contested issue at trial, no psychiatrist testified on this issue. The Court
reversed:
We hold that when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that
his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at
A. Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1276, 1278 (1966)

(The disparity of investigative resources between the defense and prosecution "is likely
to have its maximum impact in the presentation of evidence which must be analyzed and
developed in the laboratory or hospital.").
82 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION 49 (1979). See also People v. Chapter, 13 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2479 (Cal.

Super. 1973) ("In approximately eighty percent of the twenty-five [voiceprint] cases in
which such expert testimony/opinion was admitted there was no opposing expert testi-

mony on the issue of reliability and general acceptability of the scientific community
83 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 12, ch. 4 (discussing the constitutional
and statutory provisions on expert assistance for indigent defendants).
84 E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4013(B) (1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1133(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-207(b) (1990).
85 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2925.51 (Baldwin 1992) (controlled substance cases).
86 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 113-3(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) ($250 maximum
in capital cases); N.Y. CoUNTY LAW § 7-22-c (McKinney 1991) ($300 maximum unless

extraordinary circumstances shown).
87 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)(e)(1) (1985). See H.R. REP. No. 417, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6,

reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6165, 6178.
88 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 n.5 (1983).

89 470 U.S. 68 (1985).

120

PAUL C. GIANNELLI

[Vol. 84

trial, the Constitution requires that a State provide access to a psychiatrist's assistance on this issue, if the defendant cannot otherwise afford
90
one.
Unfortunately, many courts have interpreted Ake restrictively,
thereby undercutting its potential as a way of lessening the disparity
between prosecution and defense access to expert assistance. For
example, some courts have held that "Ake does not reach noncapital
cases." 9 1 Although Ake involved a capital defendant and ChiefJustice Burger, in a concurring opinion, 9 2 attempted to impose a
"death penalty" limitation on the right to expert assistance, there is
93
nothing in the majority opinion that supports such a limitation.
Indeed, the Court in Little v. Streater,9 4 a prior civil case, had ruled

that an indigent defendant in a paternity action had the right to a
blood grouping test at state expense. Therefore, the "capital trial"
limitation appears to be nothing more than a transparent attempt to
circumvent Ake.
Other courts limit Ake to psychiatric experts. According to the

Alabama Supreme Court, "there is nothing contained in the Ake decision to suggest that the United States Supreme Court was address-

ing anything other than psychiatrists and the insanity defense." 9 5
Consequently, the defendant's request for a forensic pathologist

96
was denied. Here, again, the reach of Ake is artificially restricted.
90 Id. at 74.

91 Isom v. State, 488 So. 2d 12, 13 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986). Accord McCord v. State,
507 So. 2d 1030, 1033 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987). But see Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d
1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc) ("Nor do we draw a decisive line for due-process
purposes between capital and noncapital cases."), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988).
92 The ChiefJustice wrote, "The facts of the case and the question presented confine
the actual holding of the Court. In capital cases the finality of the sentence imposed
warrants protection that may or may not be required in other cases." Ake, 470 U.S. at 87
(Burger, CJ., concurring).
93 Justice Rehnquist, the lone dissenter, acknowledged that the majority opinion was
not so limited. He criticized the majority because "the constitutional rule announced by
the Court is far too broad. I would limit the rule to capital cases." Ake, 470 U.S. at 87
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
94 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
95 Exparte Grayson, 479 So. 2d 76, 82 (Ala.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985). Accord
Stafford v. Love, 726 P.2d 894, 896 (Okla. 1986); Plunkett v. State, 719 P.2d 834, 839
(Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (no right to bloodstain expert) ("Such a risk [of error] in other
areas of scientific evidence is not necessarily present because the scientific expert is
often able to explain to the jury how a conclusion was reached, the defense counsel can
attack that conclusion, and the jury can decide whether the conclusion had a sound basis."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1019 (1986).
96 Some courts have ruled that Ake covers nonpsychiatric experts. For example, the
Eighth Circuit has ruled that "there is no principled way to distinguish between psychiatric and nonpsychiatric experts. The question in each case must be not what field of
science or expert knowledge is involved, but rather how important the scientific issue is
in the case, and how much help a defense expert could have given." Little v. Armon-
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While the critical role of psychiatry in insanity defense cases played
an important part in the decision, the Court's rationale extends to
other types of experts.9 7 Experts other than psychiatrists often play
pivotal roles in criminal cases-for example, questioned document
examiners in forgery cases.9 8 Indeed, the Court not only held that
Ake had a right to expert assistance in preparing an insanity defense
(a trial issue) but also on the issue of "future dangerousness," which
was raised in the penalty phase as in Barefoot.9 9 Again, Little v.
Streateris informative because it involved a blood test in a civil paternity action. 10 0 Here again, an unjustifiable limitation is used to undercut Ake.
Another post-Ake issue concerns the threshold standard for determining when the appointment of a defense expert is constitutionally required. Unlike the above issues, this one raises a legitimate
dispute. According to Ake, the accused must make a "preliminary
showing" that expert assistance is "likely to be a significant factor at
trial."' 0 1 In a later case, Caldwell v. Mississippi,1 0 2 the Court declined
to consider a trial court's refusal to appoint fingerprint and ballistics
trout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (error to fail to appoint hypnotist),
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988).
See also Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308, 314 (10th Cir. 1992) (error to fail to appoint
expert on battered woman syndrome); State v. Carmouche, 527 So. 2d 307 (La. 1988)
(serologists appointed); State v. Bridges, 385 S.E.2d 337, 339 (N.C. 1989) (error to fail
to appoint fingerprint expert).
97 The commentary to the ABA Standards provide:
[T]he Court's test [in Ake] for access to "basic tools of an adequate defense" has
potentially broad application in all contexts regarding the provision of support services.
The courts of a number of states have recognized a defendant's constitutional
right to a broad range of supporting services, including such diverse issues as forensic dental records, fingerprints, firearms, jury selection and demography.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 5-1.4 commentary
at 23 (3d ed. 1992).
98 As early as 1929, then-Judge Cardozo commented: "[U]pon the trial of certain
issues, such as insanity or forgery, experts are often necessary both for the prosecution
and for defense .... [A] defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage, if he is unable
because of poverty to parry by his own witnesses the thrusts of those against him." Reilly
v. Berry, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (N.Y. 1929).
See also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 97, at 22 ("The quality of representation at trial
...may be excellent and yet unhelpful to the defendant if his defense requires assistance
of a psychiatrist or handwriting expert and no such services are available.").
99 "[Due process requires access to a psychiatric examination on relevant issues, to
the testimony of the psychiatrist, and to assistance in preparation at the sentencing
phase." Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 84 (1985).
100 In a later case, Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985), the Court
declined to consider a trial court's refusal to appoint fingerprint and ballistics experts
because the defendant had not made a sufficient showing of need. The Court, however,
gave no indication that fingerprint or ballistics experts were beyond the scope of Ake.
101 Ake, 470 U.S. at 74.
102 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
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experts because the defendant had "offered little more than undeveloped assertions that the requested assistance would be beneficial."' 0 3 Ake and Caldwell represent the extremes; the former
involved compelling facts, while the latter involved the barest of assertions. 10 4 Thus, there is no "bright line test" for determining
when the requisite showing has been made. 0 5
Nevertheless, many courts have required defendants to shoulder near impossible burdens in this context. According to the Eleventh Circuit, a two-pronged test must be satisfied: the defendant
must establish a reasonable probability that (1) an expert would be
of assistance to the defense and (2) the denial of an expert would
result in a fundamentally unfair trial.' 0 6 The second prong erects a
substantial barrier, certainly one that the prosecution need not surmount when deciding whether to use expert testimony. To satisfy
this burden in a case where the defense seeks to challenge a prosecution expert, the defense "must inform the court of the nature of
the prosecution's case and how the requested expert would be useful. At the very least, [counsel] must inform the trial court about the
nature of the crime and the evidence linking [the accused] to the
crime." 0 7 As explained below, the lack of adequate discovery often
makes this burden impossible to meet. If the threshold standard is
set too high, the defendant is placed in a "catch-22" situation, in
which the standard "demand[s] that the defendant possess already
the expertise of the witness sought."' 0 8
In sum, the promise of Ake remains largely unfulfilled.10 9 With103 Id. at 323 n.1.
104 Ake's only defense was insanity. His bizarre behavior at the arraignment, just four
months after the crime, prompted the trial judge to order sua sponte a mental examination. Initially, the state psychiatrist declared Ake incompetent to stand trial, but six
weeks later Ake was determined to be competent-provided he stayed on Thorazine, an
antipsychotic drug. The state psychiatrist acknowledged the severity of Ake's mental
illness and the possibility that it "might have begun many years earlier." Finally, the
burden of producing evidence of insanity rested, under state law, with the defendant.
Ake, 470 U.S. at 87.
105 See Volson v. Blackburn, 794 F.2d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he Ake decision
fails to establish a bright line test for determining when a defendant has demonstrated
that sanity at the time of the offense will be a significant factor at the time of trial.").
106 Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 712 (11 th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054
(1987).
107 Id. at 712.
108 State v. Moore, 364 S.E.2d 648, 657 (N.C. 1988) (error to fail to appoint fingerprint expert).
109 See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
651 (4th ed. 1992) ("Generally speaking the courts have read Ake narrowly, and have
refused to require appointment of an expert unless it is absolutely essential to the defense."); David A. Harris, The Constitution and Truth Seeking: A New Theory on Expert Seroices
for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 469 (1992); David A. Harris, Ake
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out an effective right to defense experts, the accused often lacks the
resources to combat junk science. Recent bite mark cases illustrate
this point.1 10
C.

BITE MARK CASES

In Washington v. State,"' a capital case, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals ruled that a defendant was not entitled to the appointment of a defense expert, even though a prosecution expert
had testified that the defendant had made the bite mark found on a
murder victim. Moreover, the prosecution expert conceded that he
had used a novel method of comparison that no one else had ever
used, and he also testified that only "one in a billion people" had a
particular characteristic shared by the defendant. 1 2 The basis for
this astounding statistic is not revealed and is suspect.
Another bite mark case, Harrisonv. State,"13 involved the death
penalty for the murder of a ten year-old girl. A prosecution expert
testified that the defendant had bit the victim more than forty times,
but the trial court nevertheless rejected a defense request for an expert. To demonstrate a "particularized need" for a defense expert,
the trial judge required that the expert first review the evidence and
write an affidavit. Without pay, however, most experts will not review the evidence nor prepare an affidavit. By the time of the appeal, an expert had been found, and he concluded that the "marks
14
were not from bites."'
Revisited: Expert Psychiatric Witnesses Remain Beyond Reach Forthe Indigent, 68 N.C. L. REv.
763,769 (1990) ("Lower courts often have interpreted Ake less than generously, unduly
constricting the availability of the right.").
110 For a discussion of bite mark evidence, see 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra
note 12, ch. 13.
111 836 P.2d 673 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
112 The prosecution's expert testified that:
[H]e used two types of analyses to identify appellant as the assailant:
bitemark/dentition comparison and a comparison of microorganisms found in the
wound and in appellant's mouth. The doctor placed primary identification emphasis on the microorganism "aspergillus" being present in both the bitemark and in
appellant's mouth. At trial the doctor testified that aspergillus would be found in
the mouths of only "one in a billion people." Although the doctor claimed that his
tests were "accepted," he admitted that he was aware of no other persons who
either used or advocated the use of microbiological analysis in bitemark comparisons. Id. at 678 (Parks, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
113 The Henry Lee Harrison case (No. 90DP1345) in now before the Mississippi
Supreme Court. Telephone interview with John Holdridge of the Mississippi and Louisiana Capital Trial Assistance Project in New Orleans (Apr. 22, 1993). For a further
discussion, see Debra Cassens Moss, Death, Habeas and Good Lawyers: Balancing Fairness
and Finality, 78 A.B.AJ. 83, 85 (Dec. 1992). John Holdridge also noted that it is difficult
to obtain good lawyers for three reasons: "Fees may be restricted, judges are reluctant
to spend money on experts, and standards are lax for trial counsel." Id. at 84.
t14 Id. at 85.
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Although bite mark comparisons are based on objective data,
the comparison itself involves an essentially subjective judgment.
Thus, disagreements between bite mark experts is not unexpected. 1 15 Even proponents acknowledge that this type of evidence
is "hotly contested." ' 1 6 Indeed, a surprising number of cases have
involved disagreements where prosecution experts make a positive
identification but defense experts testify that the mark "was not a
bite mark at all."''17 Under these circumstances, the appointment of
a defense expert, especially in capital cases, should be almost
automatic.
D.

OTHER RECENT EXAMPLES

Other sources also indicate that the lack of defense experts continues to be a problem. In 1990, the National LawJournal published
the results of a six-month investigation of the defenses of capital
murders in the South. One of the "key findings" of this investigation concerned defense experts: "Judges routinely deny lawyers' requests for expert/investigative fees." 11 8 Another article reports:
115 People v. Milone, 356 N.E.2d 1350 (Ill.
App. 1976), is an example. Three experts
testified for the prosecution and four testified for the defense. The prosecution experts
all positively identified the defendant's teeth as the source of the bite mark found on the
murder victim. The defense experts testified either that a positive identification could
not be made, or that Milone's teeth did not make the mark. Id. at 1356.
Other cases in which experts disagreed include: State v. Sager, 600 S.W.2d 541,
563-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981); People v. Bethune, 484
N.Y.S.2d 577, 580-83 (App. Div. 1984); Spence v. State, 795 S.W.2d 743, 750-52 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1990); State v. Howe, 386 A.2d 1125, 1132 (Vt. 1978).
116 Raymond D. Rawson et al., Analysis of PhotographicDistortion in Bite Marks: A Report
of the Bite Mark Guidelines Committee, 31J. FORENSIC SCI. 1261, 1261-62 (1986) ("Although

bite mark evidence has demonstrated a high degree of acceptance, it continues to be
hotly contested in 'battles of the experts.' Review of trial transcripts reveals that distortion and the interpretation of distortion is a factor in most cases.").
117 People v. Smith, 468 N.E.2d 879, 886 (N.Y. 1984) (four prosecution experts and
three defense experts testified), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1227 (1985).
Other examples include: State v. Holmes, 601 N.E.2d 985, 991-93 (Ill. App. 1992)
(two prosecution experts testified that defendant inflicted bite marks found on victim;
two defense experts testified that marks were not bite marks and not made by defendant); Davis v. State, 611 So. 2d 906, 910 (Miss. 1992) (prosecution expert had "no
doubt" that defendant's teeth made bite mark; defense expert testified that mark on
defendant's arm was not a bite mark, but even if it were, it was inconsistent with Davis'
teeth); Kris Sperry & Homer R. Campbell, Jr., An Elliptical Incised Wound of the Breast
Misinterpretedas a Bite Injury, 35J. FORENSIC SCI. 1226 (1990) (Two odontologists made a

positive identification of bite marks in a murder trial, and then defense experts showed
that the mark had been misinterpreted-that it was not "even" a bite mark. The jury
acquitted.).
118 Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense: Trialand Errorin the Nation'sDeath Belt, NAT'L L.J.,

June 11, 1990, at 30. As part of the investigation, 60 death-row trial lawyers were interviewed. "54.2% felt court provided inadequate investigation and expert funds." Id. at
40. One attorney, who was appointed to represent a death row inmate in Georgia, had
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"In recent DNA cases in Oklahoma and Alabama ....

the defense

did not retain any experts, because the presiding judge had refused
to authorize funds." 1 1 9 In addition, a 1992 study of indigent defense systems noted that the "greatest disparities occur in the areas
of investigators and expert witnesses, with the prosecutors possess1 20
ing more resources."
In sum, the problem of "contingent fee" experts seems rather
minor when compared to a death penalty case without any expert to
rebut the prosecution's scientific evidence.
IV.

DISCOVERY

The junk science opponents also advocate expanded pretrial
discovery of expert testimony as a way to ferret out bad science.
Former Vice President Quayle asserted that:
More comprehensive inquires should be permitted of proposed 'expert' witnesses through interrogatories and depositions.... Litigants
should be able to scrutinize experts by obtaining more information
about them. To this end, disclosure of additional core data should be
required-namely, a list of the expert's publications and a description
compensation arrangement-without cost to the opof the expert's
12 1
posing party.
At the same time that the former Vice President was trumpeting the
virtues of expanded discovery in civil litigation, federal prosecutors
were opposing discovery in the first major DNA case using the FBI
procedure. In United States v. Yee,1 22 the government opposed discovery of matching criteria, environmental insult studies, populahis request for the appointment of an expert denied. He commented: "There's an economic presumption of guilt.... The district attorney has all the resources of the state
crime lab, and we have to go hat in hand to the judge and the DA on every request." Id.
at 38.
See also A Study of Representation in Capital Cases in Texas, 56 TEX. BJ. 333, 408 (Apr.
1993) (Report of The Spangenberg Group prepared for the Texas State Bar) ("There is
a serious underfunding of essential expert services and other expenses in capital trials
and appeals.")
119 Peter J. Neufeld & Neville Colman, When Science Takes the H'itness Stand, 262 Sci.
AM. 46, 53 (May 1990).
See also Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)(no defense expert testified in first appellate case considering the admissibility of DNA evidence);
Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785 (Va. 1989) (no defense expert testified in an
early DNA case); NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, COMMITrEE ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCIENCE,
DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 149 (1992) ("Because of the potential power of
DNA evidence, authorities must make funds available to pay for expert witnesses .... ").
120 ROGER A. HANSON, INDIGENT DEFENDERS: GET THEJOB DONE AND DONE WELL 100
(1992) (study by the National Center for State Courts).
121 Quayle, supra note 16, at 566.
122 129 F.R.D. 629 (N.D. Ohio 1990), adopted by 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991).

126

PAUL C. GIANNELLI

[Vol. 84

tion data, and proficiency tests.' 23 In contrast, the National
Academy of Sciences DNA report unequivocally recommends exten24
sive discovery.'
In addition, the former Vice President was apparently unaware
that the information he sought disclosed in civil trials was typically
not subject to discovery in criminal litigation.' 25 Indeed, criminal
discovery does not even match what was available under the current
civil rule, the one Quayle found so deficient. Typically, there are no
126
discovery depositions or interrogatories in criminal prosecutions,
and in many jurisdictions, the defense does not have a right to a list
27
of the prosecution witnesses, including experts.'
The most common discovery provision in criminal litigation
concerns scientific reports. There is, however, often no requirement that a report be prepared, and oral reports may not be discoverable. 28 Consequently, the defense may not learn that a
prosecution expert will testify until that expert takes the stand at
trial. Moreover, the typical lab report is grossly inadequate-often
providing only a "summary of the results of an unidentified test conducted by an anonymous technician."129 For example, a report containing the results of a gunshot residue test may not specify the
methodology used-for example, neutron activation analysis,
atomic absorption, the paraffin test, scanning electron microscopy,
or another technique. Some of these procedures are valid, but
123 The U.S. Magistrate eventually ruled in favor of the defense, but had to resort to a
creative interpretation of Criminal Rule 16, the federal discovery provision, to reach this
result. The discovery argument initially focused on whether these documents were discoverable scientific reports within the meaning of FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D). The
magistrate ultimately ruled these documents were "predicate materials" under FED. R.
CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C), which governs the inspection of documents and tangible objects.
Id. at 635.
124 "The prosecutor has a strong responsibility to reveal fully to defense counsel and
experts retained by the defendant all material that might be necessary in evaluating the
evidence." NAT'L REs. COUNCIL, supra note 119, at 145.
125 For a detailed discussion, see Paul C. Giannelli, CriminalDiscover., Scientific Evidence,
and DNA, 44 VAND. L. REV. 791 (1991).
126 Depositions are generally limited to the preservation of the testimony of a witness
who will be unavailable at trial. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15. In other words, the parties may
depose their own witnesses but not the opposing witnesses.
127 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
128 Under current Fed. R. Crim. P. 16, oral reports are not discoverable. See United
States v. Shue, 766 F.2d 1122, 1135 (7th Cir. 1985) (defendant not entitled to discovery
of verbal report of FBI photographic expert), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 956 (1987); United
States v.Johnson, 713 F.2d 654, 659 (11 th Cir. 1983) (police officer testified as an emergency medical technician without notice to defense; Rule 16 not implicated because "no
... reports were made in th[e] case."), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030 (1984).
129 United States v. Bentley, 875 F.2d 1114, 1123 (5th Cir. 1989) (Williams, J.,
dissenting).
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others are not.1 3 0 In addition, the qualifications of the expert, the
ultimate conclusion reached, 1 3 ' and the bases for the conclusion
typically are not reported. Other important documents, such as
bench notes 13 2 and graphs,13 3 may not be subject to discovery.
Finally, none of the typical reasons for distinguishing civil and
criminal discovery apply in this context.' 3 4 The ABA Standards
note: "The need for full and fair disclosure is especially apparent
with respect to scientific proof and the testimony of experts .... [I]t

is virtually impossible for evidence or information of this kind to be
13 5
distorted or misused because of its advance disclosure."'
An amendment to Criminal Rule 16, currently under consideration, would rectify most the problems discussed in this section. The
amendment reads:
(E) Expert Witnesses: At the defendant's request, the government
shall disclose to the defendant a written summary of testimony the
government intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its case in chief at trial. This summary
must describe the witnesses' opinions, the
bases and the reasons
13 6
therefor, and the witnesses' qualifications.
The junk science opponents played no part in the promulgation of
this amendment. 137 Instead, the Bush administration advocated ex130 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 12, ch. 14 (discussing the various tests,

including defects in the paraffin test).
131 See Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255, 1263 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (no error where
serologist report contained specific findings but not conclusions drawn from findings).
See also United States v. Cole, 707 F. Supp. 999, 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (ruling that Fed. R.
Crim. P. 16 entitled the accused to lab report but not to a "comprehensive preview of
the government's [expert] opinion testimony.").
132 See United States v. Iglesias, 881 F.2d 1519, 1523-24 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
chemist's bench notes concerning heroin analysis are not discoverable), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1088 (1990); United States v. Berry, 636 F.2d 1075, 1082 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding
DEA chemist's work notes are not discoverable); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d
785, 791 (Va. 1989) (holding DNA expert's work notes are not discoverable), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1093 (1990).
133 See Williams v. State, 312 S.E.2d 40, 51 (Ga. 1983) (microspectrophotometer
graphs used in fiber analysis not discoverable even though 13 graphs admitted at trial as
prosecution exhibits).
134 Opponents of liberal discovery in criminal cases argue that discovery will encourage perjury, will lead to the intimidation of witnesses, and because of the Fifth
Amendment, will be a one-way street. See 2 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 252, at 36-37 (2d ed. 1982).
135 ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 66-67
(Approved Draft 1970).
136 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E) (proposed amendment). On April 22, 1993 the
Supreme Court approved this proposal and transmitted it to Congress. Unless Congress disapproves, this provision will become effective on Dec. 1, 1993.
137 The amendment is based on a proposal made by Professor Eads. Linda Eads,
Adjudication by Ambush: Federal Prosecutors' Use of Nonscientific Experts in a System of Limited
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pansive discovery in civil cases, and opposed discovery in the DNA
cases.
V.

CONCLUSION

The "junk science" debate and the Supreme Court's decision in
Daubert have cast a spotlight on the problems associated with the use
of expert testimony and scientific evidence. Unfortunately, the
criminal side of the docket has remained in the shadows. It is time
to shift the spotlight.
The use of scientific evidence in criminal trials should be encouraged. It is often better than other types of evidence typically
used in criminal prosecutions-for example, eyewitness testimony.
The present adversary system, however, does not contain sufficient
safeguards to protect against the misuse of scientific evidence.
There is a critical need for a heightened standard which demands
demonstration of reliability before novel scientific evidence is admitted in criminal trials. A better system for providing defense experts also must be developed. Finally, criminal discovery should be
expanded; the proposed amendment to Federal Criminal Rule 16 is
an important step in the right direction.

CriminalDiscovery, 67 N.C. L. REV. 577, 622 (1989). The other article cited by the advisory committee was Giannelli, supra note 125.
The problems of discovery of scientific evidence were discussed earlier in Symposium
on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599 (1983), which included Paul C.
Giannelli, Observations on Discovery of Scientific Evidence, 101 F.R.D. 622 (1983), andJames
E. Starrs, Comments on Discovery and Its Application to the Lindbergh Kidnapping Case, 101
F.R.D. 625 (1983).

